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ABSTRACT
Due to the open nature of voice input, voice assistant (VA) systems
(e.g., Google Home and Amazon Alexa) are under a high risk of
sensitive information leakage (e.g., personal schedules and shopping
accounts). Though the existing VA systems may employ voice fea-
tures to identify users, they are still vulnerable to various acoustic
attacks (e.g., impersonation, replay and hidden command attacks).
In this work, we focus on the security issues of the emerging VA
systems and aim to protect the users’ highly sensitive information
from these attacks. Towards this end, we propose a system, WearID,
which uses an off-the-shelf wearable device (e.g., a smartwatch or
bracelet) as a secure token to verify the user’s voice commands to the
VA system. In particular, WearID exploits the readily available mo-
tion sensors from most wearables to describe the command sound in
vibration domain and check the received command sound across two
domains (i.e., wearable’s motion sensor vs. VA device’s microphone)
to ensure the sound is from the legitimate user.
The cross-domain design (audio vs. vibration) of our system lever-
ages the motion sensor’s shorter response distance to sounds (e.g.,
25 cm), distinct sensing interface and its wide availability on wear-
able devices to secure the voice access, even when the microphone
has been compromised in various acoustic attacks. However, ex-
amining the similarity of two sensing modalities is not trivial. The
huge sampling rate gap (e.g., 8000Hz vs. 200Hz) causes the two
data types hard to compare and even tiny data noises are magnified
during such comparison. Moreover, as not designed for capturing
sounds, the motion sensors show distinct response characteristics to
sounds in terms of amplitude and frequency. In this work, we inves-
tigate the complex relationship between the two sensing modalities
and develop an algorithm to convert the microphone data into low-
frequency data comparable to the acoustic responses on the motion
sensor. Our system further examines the similarity of the command
sounds described in two domains to verify whether the voice com-
mand originates from the legitimate user. We report on extensive
experiments to evaluate the WearID system under various audible
and inaudible attacks. The results show that our system can verify
the voice commands with 99.8% accuracy in the normal situation and
detect 97% fake voice commands from the various impersonation
and replay attacks and hidden voice and ultrasound attacks.
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Figure 1: Proposed architecture of WearID.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smart devices (e.g., Google Home, Amazon Alexa,
and smartphones) have incorporated advanced speech recognition
technologies that enable the devices to understand natural language
and take voice commands. By using voices as inputs, users can
smoothly and conveniently interact with their voice assistant (VA)
systems to accomplish numerous daily tasks. In particular, such a
convenient function has been quickly adopted by users and widely
used in various applications (e.g., playing music, managing calendar
events, shopping online and controlling smart home appliances).
As a result, VA systems have already been widely used in various
scenarios, such as home, workplace and even public places.
While the VA systems bring immense flexibility and convenience
to users, the highly sensitive information collected by these systems
could attract an adversary’s interests and put the user’s privacy under
high risks. For instance, when the VA system is in an open area
(e.g., in the office), the adversary can easily learn the user’s schedule
such as when to pick up his/her kid from daycare by asking the VA
system “What is my schedule to pick up my son”. Similarly, the
user’s private travel schedule such as when to attend a conference
can also be easily revealed by requesting “Remind me which day
to attend the Machine Learning conference”. Therefore, both of the
user’s family and personal sensitive information can be obtained by
simply asking one question. Furthermore, the adversary can even
request the voice assistant to execute commands that are against
the user’s will. For example, the adversary can place online orders
through the user’s associated account without knowing the credit
card information by telling the VA system “Order a MacBook from
Prime Now”, and then he can wait at the user’s address to pick up
the delivery. When the adversary can access the VA system at home
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remotely (e.g., through a hacked Smart TV), he can even use the
voice command “Unlock the exterior door” to unlock the door’s
smart locking system and gaining entry into the house.
Existing VA systems have deployed the voice biometric technol-
ogy (at least to authenticate sensitive user commands), however, this
approach identifies users based on their unique acoustic features
solely in the audio domain (i.e., extracting information from the data
captured by microphones). The acoustic features are known to be
vulnerable to impersonation attacks and replay attacks, where the
adversary can fool the systems by imitating the legitimate user’s
voice [29] or via a simple record-and-replay of the user’s previous
voice commands [20]. Moreover, recent studies show that hidden
audible voice attacks and even ultrasound attacks could access VA
systems surreptitiously even when the legitimate user is present near
the VA system [8, 34].
To address the above vulnerabilities underlying VA systems, we
propose a VA user authentication system, WearID, which leverages
the already pervasive wearable devices as an additional factor and
performs cross-domain authentication on the user’s voice commands.
WearID utilizes the low-cost motion sensors embedded in the user’s
wearable device to capture the unique voice characteristics in the
vibration domain, which is compared to the same characteristics
captured by the microphones in current VA systems and protect
the VA systems from various audio attacks. The flow of WearID
is illustrated in Figure 1. Our system simply uses the regular wake
word (e.g., “OK Google”) to trigger the authentication process. The
command sound is then captured by the microphone of the VA
system in the audio domain and the accelerometer of the wearable
device in the vibration domain, respectively.
We develop a new algorithm to perform cross-domain comparison
in audio and vibration domains. The software processing component
is deployed in the VA system’s cloud service to process the sensor
data for user authentication. If the similarity is high, the system
accepts the voice command as from the legitimate user. Otherwise,
the system rejects the voice command and sends a warning message
to alert the user. Our solution does not require special hardware or
modifications to VA systems, therefore it can be easily integrated
into existing VA systems and wearable devices. Compared to virtual
buttons [11], our system is low-user-effort, which avoids tedious
system training and cumbersome user operations on the mobile
device in practice.
Recent studies show the initial success of using motion sensors
on the smartphone to capture the speaker’s voice. For instance, Gyro-
phone [22] presents that gyroscope can capture the acoustic signals
from an external loudspeaker and reveal the speaker information
(e.g., gender and identity). Accelword [35] uses the smartphone’s
accelerometer to detect human voice for wake word recognition.
Speechless [4] identifies the condition of using the smartphone mo-
tion sensor to capture sound: the shared hard surface between the ex-
ternal speaker and the smartphone. However, implementing WearID
in practical scenarios using motion sensors in wearable devices to
enhance the security of VA system is a challenging task. First, the
vibration domain information provided by the motion sensor and
its unique acoustic characteristics remain unclear. Second, the high-
sampling-rate microphone data (e.g., 8kHz and 44.1kHz) and the
low-sampling-rate motion sensor data (e.g., 200Hz) are not directly
comparable, the relationship between two distinct sensing modal-
ities must be determined for a reasonable comparison. Third, the
synchronization of the two data sets from totally different hardware
is difficult. Fourth, the proposed system should defend against vari-
ous audible impersonation and replay attacks [20, 29] and inaudible
attacks [8, 34].
Toward this end, we explore the feasibility of leveraging the
wearable’s motion sensor to harness the aerial voice vibrations cor-
responding to live human speech. To ensure reliable cross-domain
comparison, WearID develops a spectrogram-based method to con-
vert the spectrogram of microphone data into that of lower-sampling-
rate aliased signals, making it comparable to the spectrogram from
motion sensor readings. We extensively study the unique response
distance and characteristics of the motion sensors in wearable de-
vices and identify the complex relationship between the two sensing
modalities to facilitate the data comparison. Our system is designed
to maximize the usage of motion sensors’ response in the frequency
domain and focus on the acoustic signals with the frequencies and
amplitudes that are perceivable to motion sensors during the micro-
phone spectrogram conversion. WearID leverages the VA system’s
wake word to trigger the verification process and start data collec-
tion on the VA and wearable devices simultaneously. To trigger the
data collection on the wearable device, WearID utilizes two alter-
native approaches based on WiFi communication or accelerometer-
based wake-word detection and coarsely synchronize the two differ-
ent sensing modalities. We develop a shift 2D-correlation method,
which shifts the spectrogram of the two sensing modalities’ readings
within a short time window to reduce the residual synchroniza-
tion errors and obtains the maximum 2D correlation to describe
the cross-domain similarity. In addition, WearID calibrates the data
to remove the vibration noises (e.g., hand motions) and identify
precise command sound segment during data preprocessing. This
proposed system eventually reveals the unique relationship between
two types of signals, which contains rich information embedded
in the spectrograms in two domains those are hard to be forged by
adversaries and make WearID resilient to various attacks including
audible impersonation and replay attacks and inaudible attacks.
Our Contributions:
• We find that human voices can be captured over the air by the
motion sensors embedded in wearable devices. This could serve
as an additional domain (i.e., vibration domain) to the original
audio domain to verify the user and secure the VA system.
• We propose a unique cross-domain user verification system,
WearId, which requires low-user-effort and no modifications to
the existing VA systems; it can be easily integrated with existing
VA systems and wearable devices.
• The motion sensor’s response to voice signals in short range offers
advantages to effectively prevent the impersonation and replay
sounds from accessing the wearable. We derive the unique spec-
trogram relationship between two sensing modalities (i.e., micro-
phones and motion sensors) to provide enhanced user verification
using wearable devices.
• We conduct extensive experiments and user studies with differ-
ent models of smartwatches and participants, which result in 600
human voice segments. The results show that WearID can authen-
ticate user’s voice commands with 99.8% accuracy in the normal
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situation and detect 97% of various impersonation and replay at-
tacks with a low false negative rate of 2%. When under the hidden
voice and ultrasound attacks [34], WearID achieves close to 100%
accuracy of verifying the users.
Why Use a Wearable-Assisted Approach? The convenience of
the wearable device has greatly contributed to its wide deployment
in these years. The number of wearable devices worldwide reaches
593 million in 2018 [27]. Due to its wearable/coexisting nature with
their owners, the wearable devices have been considered an effective
security token in various payment systems [24]. In this work, we
find that the motion sensors widely used in wearable devices can
capture people’s speech through the vibration in the air at a short
distance (e.g., 25cm to the mouth), which is favorable for rejecting
the spoofing attacks because it is hard to be so close to the user’s
wearable. We also find that the vibration-domain information of the
human voice contains unique characteristics to distinguish different
users.
2 RELATED WORK
Audio-domain Voice Authentication and Security Issues. The tra-
ditional user authentication methods designed for voice access sys-
tems mainly extract and distinguish each individual’s voice features
in the audio domain to identify users [7, 18, 26, 30, 32? ]. For
example, Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) [23] and
Spectral Subband Centroids (SSCs) [19] describe a voice’s timbre
and vocal-tract resonances and are widely used as unique voice
features to distinguish users. The modulation frequency [5] captur-
ing formant and energy transition details of a voice sound contains
speaker-specific information for user identification. Although these
voice authentication approaches seem to be convenient, they only
rely on the audio-domain features which are vulnerable to acoustic-
based attacks. For example, an adversary can spoof the legitimate
user to pass the voice authentication system by recording and replay-
ing a user’s voice sound [20]. In addition, the adversary can study
the user’s daily speeches and impersonate or synthesis the user’s
sound to pass the voice access system [12, 12, 20, 29].
WearID Versus Other Authentication Methods. To defend
against the replay and impersonation attacks, researchers show that
advanced speaker models, Gaussian Mixture Model and i-vector
models [3, 17], and the speech features, relative phase shift and
modulation features [13, 33] could be used to defend the voice au-
thentication systems. However, these solutions solely use the features
from the audio domain, which are still vulnerable to audio-based
attacks if the attackers have the knowledge of the characteristics of
these features. Recently, more researchers propose to determine the
liveness of the sound source by exploiting the physical features of
human speeches other than the voice features [9, 36, 37]. Specif-
ically, Chen et al. [9] examine the unique magnetic field patterns
generated by electro-acoustic transducers to detect whether the voice
sound is generated by a loudspeaker or not. VoiceLive [37] and
VoiceGesture[36] derive the time-difference-of-arrival (TDoA) and
the Doppler shifts from the received sound and detect the dynamic
acoustic characteristics that only occur in human sound to detect
liveness. However, these approaches are focusing on smartphone
and require the user to place the smartphone or microphone close
to the mouth or loudspeaker. Thus they are not applicable to the VA
systems (e.g., Google Home and Amazon Alexa) that allow users to
give voice commands from distance. Feng et al. [15] develop a user
verification system that can defend against impersonation, replay
and synthesis attacks when using the VA systems. The developed
system captures the user’s facial vibrations via an accelerometer em-
bedded in a pair of glasses. The vibrations are then compared with
the voice sound recorded by the VA system to verify whether the
voice command is given by the user wearing the glasses. However,
this approach requires the user to wear a dedicated device with a
high sampling-rate accelerometer and needs to modify the VA device
hardware.
Vibration-domain Voice Recognition. Recent studies show that
the MEMS motion sensors (e.g., accelerometer and gyroscope) are
able to capture acoustic sounds [10, 22, 35]. Gyrophone [22] utilizes
the gyroscope in a smartphone to recognize the speaker’s infor-
mation (e.g., gender and speaker identity) from the speech played
by a loudspeaker. Accelword [35] leverages the accelerometer in a
smartphone to recognize the user’s wake word sound, which reduces
the energy consumption of the personal VA system in the smart-
phone (e.g., Siri). Speechless [4] further analyzes the speech privacy
leakage including the speech content from the smartphone motion
sensors under various attacking scenarios. These works only focus
on motion sensor measurements and do not reveal the relationship
between the sensor readings and real voice recorded by microphones.
Moreover, these works only prove that human voice could impact
motion sensors in smartphones or dedicated wireless sensors, but the
impact to the motion sensors in wearable devices attached to human
bodies is unknown.
In this work, we build the first cross-domain authentication sys-
tem, WearID, which can verify the legitimacy of the voice commands
received by a VA system through the unique relationship of the hu-
man voice in the vibration and audio domains. Different from the
existing works, we show that the motion sensors embedded in com-
modity wearable devices can capture the aliasing components of
the human voice, which have distinct characteristics that can facili-
tate voice authentication. Our WearID leverages the fact that human
voice result in the mechanical waves in the air, which can be cap-
tured by the sensing modalities in both audio and vibration domains.
Our solution requires low user efforts and minimum modification to
existing VA systems. The system is training-free and does not store
users’ biometrics.
3 VULNERABILITIES OF VOICE
ASSISTANCE SYSTEMS
3.1 Potential Security Breaches in VA Systems
While the VA system brings great convenience, flexibility, and multi-
functions to users, the open nature of the voice access to the VA
systems (i.e., anyone can access the VA systems via voice sounds)
could cause serious security breaches. We study current VA sys-
tems’ types, related at-risk information/operations, and their limited
defense methods.
Two Types of VA Systems. Based on whether the VA system
is shared among a group of users or not, we divide the current
commodity VA systems into two types: Personal VA Systems are
designed only for personal use. They are usually integrated into users’
mobile devices, such as smartphones (e.g., Google Now and Siri).
Differently, Family/community Shared VA Systems are designed to
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be used in the home or office environments. They are usually built
into a stand-alone device and shared by multiple users. The typical
commodity products of this type are Amazon Alexa and Google
Home. The differences between these two types of VA systems are
that the personal VA system usually takes voice commands using the
microphone of the user’s mobile device, which is in the proximity to
the user, while the family/community shared VA system is usually
designed to pick up users’ voice commands from a distance in
a house or office. The family/community shared VA systems are
considered to be of higher risk because adversaries could easily
access the VA systems without being noticed. Thus, this type of VA
system is the primary focus of this work.
At-risk Information/Operations in VA Systems. VA systems
are usually linked to the users’ personal information and even their
family/community information. When an adversary has access to
the VA system, he can easily get the user’s private information.
For example, the adversary can get the user’s shopping information
by asking “What is in my shopping list?”. The adversary can also
get the personal email content by saying “Read me my email”.
Furthermore, the adversary can get the user’s family schedule via
the voice command ”List all events for January 1st”. Moreover,
recent VA systems are usually deployed as a hub connecting various
smart appliances at home or in the office. In that case, the adversary
can use voice commands to control the smart appliances without
permission. For instance, an adversary can put the user in danger
by saying “Unlock the exterior door”. Along with this direction, we
investigate the privacy-sensitive voice commands, related to issues
of private information leakage and unauthorized operations.
Limited Defense Methods in VA Systems. Most of the off-the-
shelf VA systems require a pre-defined voice command (known
as wake word) to wake up the system, such as “Alexa” and “OK
Google”. These wake words could be used to verify the identity of
the speaker by comparing with the pre-recorded sounds in the user
profile, which is built when the user enrolls the system. However,
such audio-based speaker verification in the current VA systems is
not trustworthy, because the acoustic features they depend on can
be easily spoofed. To warn the VA system users about this issue,
Google Home particularly notes that “A similar voice might be
able to access this info, too” [2]. Furthermore, current VA systems
can only verify users based on the wake words, leaving the voice
commands unprotected from the attacks. Thus an adversary only
needs to focus on attacking the wake words, which makes the attack
much easier. In addition, we find that the VA system stays in the
listening mode for a long time (e.g., 30 seconds for Google Home)
to capture voice commands after being woken up. During this time
period, the VA system is defenseless to any adversary. Moreover,
research shows that the audio-based VA systems are vulnerable to
various audio attacks, including imitation and replay attacks.
3.2 Attack Model
We consider an adversary who is interested in obtaining the user’s
private information or exerting an unpermitted operation from the
stand-alone family/community shared VA device, which involves
multiple users and is exposed to much more security issues com-
pared to the personal VA device. We assume the adversary can not
physically break the VA device, take control of the VA cloud service
or get the possession of the user’s wearable device. We also assume
that the VA user always wears a wearable when using the VA system,
which is normal for most wearable users. We summarize the poten-
tial attacks in two major categories. Attack on User’s Absence is one
type of attacks that need to be launched when the user is absent from
the VA device. Otherwise, the user could notice the attacking sound
and stop the attack. Co-location Attack is the other type of attacks
that can be launched surreptitiously even when the user is present to
the VA device without causing notice.
Attack on User’s Absence. When the user is away from the VA
device, an adversary could get close to the VA device and launch the
following attacks without being detected:
• Random Attack. An adversary who does not know the user’s voice
characteristics can try to fool the VA system by using his own
voice. Because the adversary only needs to attack the single wake
word, such attack still has high success rates. In addition, this
attacking scenario includes occasional access. For example, a
family/community member having similar voice characteristics
may access another user’s private information accidentally.
• Impersonation Attack. An experienced adversary who knows the
user’s voice characteristics can attack the VA system by imitating
the user’s voice. The adversary can also synthesize the user’s voice
by using an audio editing software and playback the synthesized
sound via a loudspeaker to launch the attack.
• Replay Attack. An adversary who has the opportunity to observe
the user’s voice command sounds can use a microphone to record
the voice sounds and playback the recorded voice commands via
a loudspeaker to fool the VA system.
Co-location Attack. When the user is in proximity to the VA
system, an adversary could still launch the following attacks without
being detected:
• Hidden voice attack. An adversary may embed the recorded user’s
voice commands into the background of music or video streams
or directly generate command sounds according to the knowledge
of the underlying VA system [8]. The generated command sound
can be recognized by VA systems but not perceptible to human.
Moreover, an adversary can control the volume or mute the VA
device via hidden commands to avoid being noticed from the
audible reply.
• Ultrasound Attack. An adversary may use a microphone to record
the user’s voice commands, modulate the recorded voice com-
mands onto the ultrasound frequency band (i.e., ≥ 20KHz), and
use the modulated sound to fool the VA system. Although human
ears can not hear the modulated voice commands, they can still be
recognized by existing VA systems [34] due to the non-linearity
of the microphone.
4 USER VERIFICATION DESIGN
4.1 System Purpose and Challenges
Our system checks the proximity between the user and his/her voice
command sound to verify whether the voice command comes from
the legitimate user, who is also present to the VA system. The basic
idea is to compare the command sound across the audio domain (i.e.,
via the VA device’s microphone) and the vibration domain (i.e., via
the motion sensor of the user’s wearable). If the command sound
matches across the two domains, the voice command is verified to
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Figure 2: Hardware flow of microphone and motion sensor.
come from the legitimate user (i.e., owner of the wearable device).
Existing VA systems only focus on verifying wake words and neglect
the protection of more sensitive voice commands, which opens more
opportunities for adversaries. In comparison, our system requires
confirming whether the voice commands come from the right user.
There are many challenges to design such a system. For example, it is
challenging to match the command sound from the sensors working
in two different domains, which have a considerable gap in sampling
rates (e.g., 8000Hz versus 200Hz). In addition, it is unknown whether
the motion sensors on wearables provide sufficient information to
characterize human voice sounds, in light of their low fidelity and
not dedicated purpose for recording sound. Furthermore, how to
trigger synchronize the authentication process on both the VA device
and the wearable device need to be explored. As last, the proposed
authentication system should defend against various attacks when
the user is present or absent to the VA device.
4.2 System Flow
Toward this end, we develop a unique VA system, WearID, which
verifies the authenticity of voice commands through the sensing data
obtained from the vibration and audio domains. Figure 3 illustrates
the flow of WearID. Our system requires the Audio Domain Data
Collection and the Vibration Domain Data Collection to collect
the microphone from VA device and accelerometer data from the
wearable, which describe the user’s voice interaction with the VA
system in two different domains. Coarse-grained Synchronization
aims at triggering the motion sensors to record the voice commands
at the right time (i.e., after the wake word) and provides coarse
synchronization between the two domain data. The insight is that
the wake word, which is mandatory for initiating the VA device,
could be utilized to trigger the data collection on both devices at the
same time. We propose two alternative approaches to achieve the
coarse-grained synchronization. The WiFi Communication-based
approach only requires the VA device to detect the wake word and
trigger the wearable to start data collection through the WiFi com-
munication when both devices are in the same WiFi network [25].
We note that emerging wearables are in a trend of having standalone
WiFi modules that can connect to WiFi networks directly. In the
case of wearables not having WiFi modules, they still can connect
to WiFi networks through their paired smartphones. The alterna-
tive approach Parallel Wake-word Detection-based approach uses
the motion sensor in the wearable device to detect the wake word
independently based on voice recognition in vibration domain to
initiate the sensor data collection. To achieve this, WearID reuses
the motion sensor data from the ongoing fitness tracking App, which
continuously counts the user’s walking steps. After the synchroniza-
tion, both the wearable and VA device start to continuously collect
the accelerometer and microphone data respectively to capture the
voice command. The data will be uploaded to a cloud server that is
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Figure 3: User verification overview.
running our processing algorithm to further derive the cross-domain
similarity for user authentication.
WearID has three core components: The Vibration Domain Fea-
ture Derivation and Audio Domain Feature Derivation derive reliable
time-frequency features from the data collected by the wearable’s
motion sensor and the VA device’s microphone, respectively. The
derived features are converted to comparable spectrograms based on
a complicated unique relationship between the audio and vibration
domains. The Correlation-based Legitimate User Verification calcu-
lates the similarity between the spectrograms from two domains for
user verification.
In particular, the Vibration Domain Feature Derivation removes
the mechanical noise (e.g., due to hand movements) from the motion
sensor data by using a high-pass filter and extracts the command
sound segment from the motion sensor readings by examining the
moving variances. The two-dimension time-frequency description
of signal, spectrogram, is then derived from the identified motion
sensor segment. Similarly, the Audio Domain Feature Derivation
pre-process the microphone data to remove the acoustic noise and
identify the command sound segment, which is utilized to derive
the spectrogram. The next is to convert the microphone spectro-
gram to the low-frequency form comparable to the motion sensor
and maximize the intersection of the two distinct sensing modali-
ties’ acoustic responses. The Frequency Selection and Amplitude
Selection select the frequency/amplitude of the microphone spec-
trogram for conversion according to the identified unique acoustic
characteristics of motion sensor. Moreover, the Spectrogram-based
Frequency Conversion converts the microphone spectrogram into
low-frequency spectrogram, which describe the similar responses
on the motion sensor. The Correlation-based Legitimate User Verifi-
cation first performs the Spectrogram Normalization to normalize
the time lengths and magnitudes of the spectrogram in two domains.
Shift 2D Correlation-based Similarity Calculate computes the 2D-
correlation between the spectrograms to check the similarity and
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Figure 4: Experiment setup for preliminary study and the ac-
celerometer response distance test.
shift one spectrogram over time during calculation to address the
synchronization errors. The resulted maximum 2D-correlation co-
efficient is compared with a threshold to determine whether the
command sound received by the VA device is from the legitimate
user (i.e., wearable owner).
4.3 Why Wearable? Why Motion Sensor? Why
not a Second Microphone?
We consider the wearable device as a trusted device because of
its unique attribute, usually worn on the user body and rarely left
unattended. In addition, many recent wearable-based continuous
authentication schemes further guarantee its usage as a unique ID.
Moreover, the pervasive deployment of the wearable device further
facilitates its usage as an ID. The wearable devices are embedded
with many sensors, such as the microphone and the motion sensor.
Why does WearID choose motion sensors to provide enhanced secu-
rity to the VA system instead of a microphone on the wearable? The
reasons are three folds. First, only a small number of the high-end
wearable devices contain a microphone. In comparison, most of
the wearable devices are embedded with a motion sensor due to
its design purpose for various applications such as fitness tracking,
gesture control and activity recognition. Second, the motion sensor
has a short response distance to sound, which prevent most acoustic
accesses that are from the sound source other than the wearable
owner. Three, motion sensors provide a distinct sensing modality
and the user verification across two domains provides much higher
security than adding an additional microphone. If an adversary can
issue impersonated commands to the voice assistant’s microphone,
it can also do the same to the second microphone, if used. For exam-
ple, the two-microphone based approach is vulnerable to ultrasound
and hidden command attacks [6]. Fourth, the low-frequency mo-
tion sensors have low power consumption and do not require much
programming or processing on the wearable.
5 FEASIBILITY OF USER VERIFICATION IN
VIBRATION DOMAIN
5.1 Relationships and Differences between
Microphone and Accelerometer
Both microphone and accelerometer are Micro Electro Mechanical
System (MEMS) sensors. However, the hardware designs of the two
sensors are greatly different. We compare the processing components
reside in microphone and accelerometer as the following.
MEMS Microphone. The MEMS microphones are widely used
in various sound recording devices, including voice assistants (e.g.,
Google Home and Amazon Echo). The MEMS microphone consists
of a membrane and a complementary perforated black-plate [31]. In
the presence of human voice, the sound passes through the holes
in the black-plate and hits the membrane, where the sound waves
are captured according to the capacity changes and are converted to
analog signals [16]. Figure 2 shows the hardware components in a
microphone. We can find that the analog signals are amplified and
fed to a Low Pass Filter (LPF), where the cutoff frequency is set
to 4KHz, 8KHz or 22KHz corresponding to the device’s sampling
rate 8KHz, 16KHz and 44KHz. The Analog-to-Digital Converter
(ADC) then digitizes the analog signals. Particularly, the sample rate
of ADC determines the maximum frequency of the recorded sounds,
though the analog signal can capture sound with higher frequencies
(i.e., over 22kHz).
MEMS Accelerometer. The accelerometers used in most mobile
devices and wearable devices are MEMS also sensors. In the ac-
celerometer, the sound could be measured as the subtle movements
of the inertial mass caused by the changing sound wave pressures.
The set of the hardware components of the accelerometer is different
from that of the microphone. As shown in Figure 2, the accelerome-
ter does not contain a LPF between the amplifier and the ADC. Thus
it would experience high signal aliasing if the signal before the ADC
is greater than the sampling rate (e.g., the maximum sampling rate
200Hz allowed in Android system). Such characteristics, however,
could be exploited to capture sounds with frequencies higher than
the accelerometer’s sampling rate.
5.2 Response Frequency and Distance of the
Built-in Accelerometer
Though the motion sensors have been shown to be resonant to sounds,
when they are embedded in the wearable devices, their responses
to sound are also affected by the device cases and other electric
components. To examine the capability of built-in accelerometer on
picking up the sound, we conduct a set of analysis for its response
distance and frequency.
Short Response Distance. We first validate the capability of
built-in accelerometer on picking up voice under various distances.
A preliminary experiment is conducted leveraging a loudspeaker,
which plays a recorded voice command (i.e., "one") with the fixed
volume. As shown in Figure 4 (a), we place the loudspeaker on a
stand, which does not share any solid surface with the wearable (i.e.,
LG Urbane W150). The voice command is played under distances
from 5cm to 35cm. In Figure 4 (b), we can observe that the amplitude
response of accelerometer decreases with the distance, and over the
distance of 25cm, the response to sound can be barely observed.
Such short response distance of the accelerometer can help to reject
voice commands that are not from the wearable owner.
Frequency Response. Next, we examine the built-in accelerom-
eter’s frequency response to the sound. We generate a frequency
sweeping signal from 0Hz ∼ 22kHz and play the sound with a
loudspeaker. An accelerometer (i.e., on Huawei Watch 2) and a mi-
crophone (i.e.,on Nexus 6) are placed on the desk, which does not
share any solid surface with the loudspeaker as shown in Figure 4 (a).
We show the frequency responses of the two devices in Figure 5. We
observe that the wearable’s accelerometer shows a shorter range of
frequency response to the sound, compared to the microphone. The
results are promising since the wearable device’s accelerometer can
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Figure 5: Responses of the microphone and the accelerometer
to a chirp from 0Hz to 22kHz (in time-domain amplitude).
(a) Spectrogram of microphone (b) Spectrogram of wearable accelerometer
Figure 6: Frequency response of chirp 500Hz ∼ 1000Hz for mi-
crophone and accelerometer of wearable device (i.e., Huawei
watch 2 sport).
capture sounds with frequencies that the major human voice resides
in. Additionally, the wearable’s limited capability on sensing the
high-frequency sound (i.e., over 4kHz) show the potential to reject
the audible hidden voice attack [8] and the inaudible ultrasound
attacks [34].
5.3 Interpreting Accelerometer Readings via
Signal Aliasing
The wearable device’s motion sensor sampling rate is limited within
200Hz by the operating system. According to Nyquist theorem, the
sampling rate of 200Hz allows the motion sensor to present the
signal with up to 100Hz frequency. As introduced in Section 5.1,
the lack of a LPF before the ADC causes the motion sensor to exert
signal aliasing when receiving sound signals. But due to this, the
motion sensor can go beyond its sampling rate to hear the sound
frequency higher than 100hz. The signal aliasing is a phenomenon
when the frequency components shift to new frequency points and
overlapped with that frequency. Particularly, we describe the aliasing
signal as following:
falias = | f − N fs |,N ∈ Z , (1)
where falias , f and fs denotes the aliasing frequency, original audio
signal frequency and sampling rate. This equation reveals the rela-
tionship between the microphone data and the motion sensor data. In
particular, for each audio frequency f , we can calculate the response
frequency point falias at the wearable’s accelerometer and we can
reconstruct the frequency responses of motion sensor as Figure 6(b),
if given a chirp microphone data as Figure 6(a). However, Equa-
tion 1 shows that one frequency point at the motion sensor could
be resulted from many audio frequencies. And the combination of
many audio frequencies such as the human voice sound could make
the aliased signal on the wearable very hard to interpret. Thus in
this work, one of my major task is to explore the unique relationship
between the microphone data and the accelerometer data and match
the sound across the two domains for authentication.
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Figure 7: Converting the microphone data of a frequency chirp
(0 ∼ 4KHz) into the low frequency data based on spectrogram.
5.4 Challenge of Cross-domain Command Sound
Verification
WearID matches the command sound across the audio domain and
the vibration domain to verify the voice commands. However, due to
the huge sampling rate gap between the two sensing modalities and
their distinct characteristics when responding to sound, the cross-
domain sound comparison is not trivial. Specifically, the sampling
rates of microphone data are normally above 8kHz while the rates
for the wearable motion sensor is at most 200Hz. Re-sampling the
microphone data and the motion sensor data to the same sampling
rate could fill this gap, but a slight noise in the data can be ampli-
fied during the high rate re-sampling, which greatly impacts the
comparison results. Moreover, the distinct characteristics of the two
different sensing modalities and their fidelity differences cause the
two domain information even harder to match. The difficulties of
comparing the microphone data with the motion sensor are presented
with more details in Appendix A.1.
6 PREVENT PRIVACY LEAKAGE FROM
VOICE ASSISTANT ATTACKS
Different from the microphone, the accelerometer shows its unique
characteristics when responding to sounds, resulting from its sensor
structure, the vibrations of other components in the wearable and
the low sensor fidelity. In order to match the voice command sounds
captured from the two different sensing modalities to verify the user,
our basic idea is to convert the high frequency microphone data into
the low frequency data that describes the "equivalent" response of
sound on the accelerometer. In this section, we first investigate the
complex relationship between the audio domain and the vibration
domain. We next introduce our method to leverage such complex
relationship to match the microphone sound with the accelerometer
readings and provide cross-domain user verification.
6.1 Cross-domain Command Sound Comparison
Spectrogram Derivation. As the time-domain analysis is shown to
be limited to describe the complex relationship between the high
frequency microphone and the low frequency motion sensor data
(Appendix A.1), we resort to the time-frequency analysis and derive
the spectrogram (i.e., two-dimensional representation of the signal)
to analyze their unique responses to sound. Particularly, we compute
the Discrete Time Short Time Fourier Transform (DT-STFT) of the
microphone/accelerometer readings x(n) using a sliding window
function as expressed in equation 2.
DTSTFT (m,ω) =
m+N−1∑
n=m
x(n)w(n −m)e−jωn , (2)
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Figure 8: Comparison of the motion sensor data spectrogram
with the converted microphone data spectrogram (illustrated
with the word sound "Alexa").
where m and ω are the time index and frequency index of the two di-
mension signal description, w(n) is a window function, and N is the
DT-STFT size of the data in the sliding window (e.g., 2048 for micro-
phone data and 64 for accelerometer readings). We then compute the
magnitude squared of the DT-STFT P(m,ω) = |DTSTFT (m,ω)|2,
which is the power spectrum at timem. Next, we slide the window
by step of size p and obtain the time series of the squared DT-STFT
as S = [P(0,ω), P(p,ω), ..., P(M−Np ,ω)]. Figure 6 illustrates the de-
rived spectrogram of microphone data and the accelerometer data
when responding to a frequency chirp, where each column represents
a power spectrum of the microphone/accelerometer when responding
to a chirp frequency point.
Spectrogram-based Frequency Conversion. To convert the
spectrogram of high-frequency microphone data to the low-
frequency one that is comparable to the accelerometer spectrogram,
we develop a spectrogram-based frequency conversion method to
generate the aliased low frequency microphone data similar to that
observed on accelerometer. The high-to-low frequency conversion
takes as input original microphone spectrogram point Smic (tn ,ωm )
and calculates its new position (tn ,ωw ) in the converted low fre-
quency spectrogram. In particular, the original microphone fre-
quency point ωm is mapped to a low frequency point ωw based
on the signal aliasing equation 6, while the time point is unchanged.
The resulted new spectrogram is computed as Sˆmic (tn ,ωw ) =∑inf
n=− inf Smic (tn ,win(|ωm + n × ωws |)), where win() is a window
function having non-zero value for [0,ωws ] and ωws is the sam-
pling frequency of accelerometer. Based on our spectrogram-based
frequency conversion, the spectrogram of the microphone data can
be transformed into the low-frequency spectrum. For example, for
the single frequency chirp, the spectrogram in Figure 6(a) can be
transformed to the similar aliased “Zigzag” form as the accelerom-
eter’s spectrogram in Figure 6(b). But the human sound is more
complicated than a single frequency chirp. To convert the micro-
phone spectrogram to the more “precise” low frequency form as the
accelerometer, we also need to study the unique characteristics of
accelerometer.
Frequency and Amplitude Selection. Except the low sampling
rate, the accelerometer’s sensor structure, the vibrations of other elec-
tric components in the wearable device and the low sensor fidelity
all cause the accelerometer to respond to sounds differently from a
microphone. In particular, these factors cause the accelerometer to
subdue some frequencies while in favor of responding to other fre-
quencies with higher amplitude. Moreover, being not dedicated for
recording sound, the accelerometer shows lower sensitivity to sounds
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Figure 9: The spectrogram correlation based on our method.
and some small volume sounds may not result in readings in the
accelerometer but can be easily recorded by microphones. To reveal
the complex relationship between the two sensing modalities when
recording sounds, we compare the accelerometer’s spectrogram with
the converted low-frequency spectrogram of microphone for every
frequency point of a chirp signal. In particular, we extract the maxi-
mum amplitude on each spectrum (i.e., column of the spectrum) at
every time index and obtain a clear frequency sweeping curve for
the two sensing modalities as shown in Figure 7. Compared with the
microphone, the accelerometer only respond to a small frequency
range (700Hz - 3300Hz) (i.e., blue zigzag frequency sweeping curve).
Moreover, for this frequency range, the frequency sweeping curves
of the two sensing modalities match well. Besides the response fre-
quency range, we also analyze the amplitude of the sound that could
generate responses on the wearable’s accelerometer. In particular,
we find that when the sound is greater than 70dB, the sound can
leave obvious responses on the wearable, which is consistent with
the observations in Accelword [35]. Therefore, in order to facili-
tate the similarity comparison between the two sensing modalities,
wearID needs to convert the microphone data to low frequency data
following the same frequency range and response amplitude of the
accelerometer, which maximize their acoustic response intersections.
Figure 8(b) illustrates an example of the converted spectrogram of
the microphone data for the word sound "Alexa", which shows an
"equivalent" low frequency spectrogram as that of the accelerometer
in Figure 8 (a).
Spectrogram-based Conversion Algorithm. We now introduce
the spectrogram-based microphone data conversion algorithm, which
integrates the spectrogram-based frequency conversion, the fre-
quency selection and the amplitude selection. As shown in Appendix
Algorithm 1, the transformation algorithm takes microphone spectro-
gram Smic and the sampling rate of the accelerometer fws as input
and calculates the new spectrogram ˆSmic that locates within the low-
frequency range (e.g., 0 − 200Hz) as the output. For each column
of spectrogram (i.e., 1 − T ), the algorithm only selects the power
spectrum point within frequency 700Hz to 3300Hz and with the
magnitudes greater than 70dB for conversion. Spectrogram-based
frequency conversion is then performed to the selected spectro-
gram points based on equation 1. If multiple spectrogram points are
mapped to the same point in the new spectrogram, their magnitudes
are added together. Finally, the converted microphone spectrogram
is in the same frequency range of accelerometer and could describe
the sound in vibration domain similar to the accelerometer.
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6.2 Legitimate User Verification
Spectrogram Normalization. The scales of amplitude are greatly
different in accelerometer and microphone readings. Before check-
ing the similarity of the two modalities’ data, we develop the 2D-
interpolation scheme and the 2D-normalization scheme to normal-
ize the two spectrograms both in time and magnitude. In particu-
lar, the 2D-interpolation scheme performs row-based interpolation
to align the two spectrograms. The 2D-normalization resolves the
scale differences of the two spectrograms’ magnitudes and conduct
column-based normalization to unify the magnitudes within [0, 1].
The 2D-normalization is described in equation 3:
Snorm (tn ,wm ) = S(tn ,wm ) − Smin (tn )
Smax (tn ) − Smin (tn ) , (3)
S(tn ,wm ) is a power spectrum point at time tn and
Smax (tn ), Smin (tn ) denote the maximum and minimum power
spectrum magnitude at time tn .
Cross-domain Similarity Calculation based on Shift 2D-
Correlation. Next, we match the command sounds across the audio
domain and the vibration domain and calculate the 2D-correlation
coefficient between the microphone and accelerometer spectrograms
using equation: Corr (Smic , Sacc ) = A×B√
A2×B2 ,
where A, B represent two spectrogram matrixes. Note that the
microphone data and the accelerometer data are coarsely synchro-
nized in 6.3.1 and the synchronization error may affect the similarity
comparison accuracy. To address this issue, we conduct the Shift
2D-Correlation when computing the correlation between the spectro-
grams of the microphone and accelerometer. In particular, we fix the
microphone spectrogram and shift the spectrogram of accelerometer
one index by one index along time axis to calculate the similarity.
More specifically, we use a sliding window with a fixed size and
shift it to left or right on the accelerometer’s spectrogram within time
T (e.g., 500ms). The 2D-correlation is calculated for each shift and
the maximum 2D-correlation coefficient is found as the similarity
score of the two domain information. A threshold-based method
is then applied to examine the similarity score and verify the user.
Figure 9(a) illustrates the similarity comparison result of the above
method to differentiate 20 different words. Clearly, the diagonal
comparisons show much higher correlation coefficients, which can
be distinguished from that of the different words. Figure 9(b) further
confirms the efficiency of our method to differentiate a user’s 20
voice commands (i.e., sentences), which are distinguished better,
because sentences contains much more voice information than sin-
gle words. Compared with Figure A, it is clear that our method can
verify whether the recorded sounds in the two domains are from the
same sound source, because our method identifies the complex rela-
tionship between the two domains and captures the most response
intersections between them.
6.3 Data Preprocessing
6.3.1 Coarse-grained Synchronization. Coarse-grained syn-
chronization triggers the VA device and wearable to collect the
command sound and perform coarse synchronize for both devices.
The existing VA system requires the user to speak a wake word
such as "OK Google" and "Alexa" to wake up the VA device be-
fore taking any voice commands. WearID integrates such method to
trigger the verification process and start the data collection on both
Wake Word 
Detection
Synchronization 
For Data Collection
Noise Removal
Figure 10: Synchronization of the microphone data (8000Hz)
and accelerometer data (200Hz) and the hand vibration noise
removal from accelerometer data.
microphone and accelerometer. In particular, we develop two alter-
native approaches, the WiFi communication-based method and the
parallel wake-word detection method. 1) WiFi communication-based
method leverages the existing setting that the wearable device and
the VA device are connected to the same WiFi network [25]. The VA
device after being waked sends a message through connected WiFi
network to the wearable device to trigger its data collection. While
standalone wearables directly receive the WiFi packet, the wearables
that work with a paired smartphone can receive the message relayed
by the smartphone’s Bluetooth. In addition, the time lag between
the microphone and accelerometer data is usually less than 40ms,
which is mainly caused by the network delay and the system time
differences. Figure 10(a) and (b) show the accelerometer readings
of the WiFi communication-based method, where the accelerometer
starts recording after receiving the waked VA device’s message. Note
that the data on the microphone and the accelerometer are roughly
synchronized. 2) As an alternative method, the parallel wake-word
detection method requires the wearable to detect the wake word in
parallel with the VA device to trigger command sound recording.
The wearable reuses the accelerometer data from an ongoing fitness
APP to recognize the wake word. Our study shows that a wake word
can be recognized based on accelerometer from 10 words with 83%
accuracy by Random Forest. Moreover, the wake-word detection on
the wearable can be further improved if assisted with a hand motion
detection scheme (e.g., a lift-hand motion).
6.3.2 Noise Removal. We note that the accelerometer data on
the wearable contains much vibration noises (e.g., hand vibrations)
as shown in Figure 10(b). While these vibration noises are in low-
frequency compared to acoustic signals, we apply a high-pass filter
(e.g., cutoff frequency 30Hz) to remove the noise and obtain the
accelerometer data that describes the command sound more pre-
cisely as shown in Figure 10(c). We find that the high-pass filter
can effectively reduce the noise introduced by hand movements
or other mechanical vibrations and the resulted accelerometer data
(Figure 10(c)) shows a slightly similar shape to the microphone
data (Figure 10(a)). To obtain the microphone data that precisely
captures command sound and remove the acoustic noises, we apply
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Figure 11: The experimental setup and the two representative
ways of holding the wearable device.
a bandpass filter (e.g., 300−4000Hz) to filter out the acoustic sounds
beyond human voice frequency range.
6.3.3 Command Sound Segmentation. We next search for the
starting point and ending point of the voice command on both the
microphone and the accelerometer data to identify the voice com-
mand segments respectively. In particular, we analyze the moving
variance of the data amplitudes and extract the envelope that covers
the command sound. We then apply a threshold-based method to
search for the starting/ending points. The command sound segmen-
tation on microphone is easy and accurate. But on the accelerometer,
the segmentation errors may be large due to its low sensitivity to
sound and low sampling rate. To address this issue, we apply the
microphone-based command sound segmentation results to assist the
command sound segmentation on the accelerometer. Because both
data are coarsely synchronized, we search for the starting point on
accelerometer within a windowWT after the starting point identified
on the microphone data. Moreover, we calculate the ending point on
accelerometer data based on the command sound length obtained
from the microphone data.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
7.1 Experimental Methodology
Device. To evaluate WearID, two smartwatch models, Huawei 2
sport (100Hz) and LG W150 (200Hz) are involved to collect ac-
celerometer readings. The accelerometer specifications of the two
wearable devices are listed in Appendix Table A. The two smart-
watches run Android Wear OS 2.0 with Bluetooth LE. Although the
sampling rate of the accelerometers could reach 4000Hz, the vendors
constrain the sampling frequencies to be under 200Hz to ensure low
power consumption. We record the voice commands leveraging a
typical VA device, Google Home, which supports 8 ∼ 96kHz audio
recording. We use Logitech S120 speaker [21] to conduct replay
attacks and hidden voice commands. To evaluate WearID against
ultrasound attack, we use a function generator (i.e., Keysight Tech-
nologies 33509B [28]) together with a tweeter speaker [14] which
has the 2kHz ∼ 25kHz frequency range.
Experimental Setup. We evaluate the performance of WearID
to verify VA system users in a typical office environment, where reg-
ular ambient noises (e.g., air condition and people walking around)
are presented. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 11. The
participant speaks voice command to a VA system placed 1 meter
way while holding the wearable device horizontally or vertically to
mouth. Note that the users can choose to hold the wearable in any
way, and without loss of generality, we evaluate WearID with the
two typical ways of using the wearable (e.g., checking time). To
imitate the hidden voice commands and the ultrasound attack, we
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Figure 12: Average ROC curve of verifying the user using
Huawei watch 2 under normal situation, random attack and
impersonate/replay attacks.
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Figure 13: Average ROC curve of verifying the user using LG
Urban W150 under normal situation, random attack and im-
personate/replay attacks.
use the experimental setup as shown in Figure 4. In particular, we
examine an extreme case where the loud speaker and the tweeter
speaker are placed at 25cm distance to the wearable. In practical
attack, the speakers could not be placed too close to the user without
causing the user’s attention.
Data Collection. We involve 10 participants to test WearID under
the normal situation and various attacks over a six-month period. The
participants are asked to speak 20 representative voice command
sentences as listed in Appendix Table B while wearing different
wearables and holding it in two typical ways. From each partici-
pant, 80 voice command sound samples are collected. Besides, 10
types and 100 hidden voice command sounds are utilized to evaluate
WearID against hidden voice command attack [1], and a frequency
sweeping signal from 15kHz ∼ 25kHz is used to evaluate WearID
against ultrasound attack. In total, 1000 data samples are collected
for microphone and motion sensor respectively.
Evaluation Metrics. To evaluate our system performance, we
define the following five different metrics: true positive rate (TPR)
is the percentage of legitimate voice commands being correctly
verified; false positive rate (FPR) is the percentage of the adversaries’
voice commands that pass the verification system; receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) curve is generated by plotting the TPR against
the FPR under thresholds from 0 to 1 with a step of 0.01; area
under the ROC curve (AUC); False Negative Rate (FNR) equaling
to 1 −TPR is the percentage of legitimate users’ commands being
incorrectly rejected.
7.2 Normal Situation
We first evaluate WearID in the normal situation when the user
accesses the VA device while wearing a wearable and there is no
targeted attack. The VA device records the user’s voice command
sound and the wearable device records the same sound simultane-
ously, if it is worn by the user. But if the wearable is not worn by the
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Figure 14: Confusion matrix for distinguishing people’s voices
based on the same commands with horizontal holding way.
user, it only records the environmental noises (e.g., acoustic noises
and mechanical noises), because the wearable is not presented. The
red curves in Figure 12(a) and (b) present the ROC curve of WearID
to verify the legitimate users using Huawei watch 2 under the normal
situation, when the user uses the wearable in two typical ways. In
particular, WearID achieves 99.8% TPR and 0% FPR to recognize
the legitimate users with Huawei watch 2 for both holding ways.
The red curves in Figure 13(a) and (b) shows the ROC obtained
by LG W150 smartwatch. We find that WearID recognizes 99.6%
legitimate users’ commands for both holding ways while FPR is 0%.
The false negative rate in the normal situation for both smartwatches
is 0.02% 0.04%, which indicates that WearID is robust and accurate
to support the users’ daily usage of the VA device.
7.3 Attack on User’s Absence
When the user is not present to the VA system, an adversary can reach
to the VA device and perform random attack or more sophisticated
impersonate and replay attacks to access the legitimate user’s privacy
in the VA device. During such attacks, the VA device’s microphone
picks up the attacking sound and the legitimate user’s wearable,
while in a different place with the user, may record the owner’s
sound and the environmental noises.
7.4 Differentiating People’s Voices.
We first evaluate WearID’s capability to differentiate people’s com-
mand sounds across two domains, because when the user is absent
with his/her wearable, the voice sounds received by the VA de-
vice may be different from that on the wearable. We consider an
extreme case where we ask participants to speak the same voice
commands to either the VA device or the wearable and evaluate
WearID’s capability to differentiate people’s voices when fixing the
speech content. In particular, each participant’s accelerometer data
is compared with other participants’ microphone data to calculate
speech similarity. Figure 14 shows the confusion matrix to differen-
tiate people’s voices between the VA device’s microphone and the
two smartwatches when they are held horizontally. We observe that
WearID can accurately detect voice sounds received by the micro-
phone and accelerometer to be from the same or different people.
In particular, Huawei Watch 2 shows an average of 96% and the LG
Urban W150 achieves 86% accuracy. Figure 15 further confirms our
observation by showing the results of differentiating people’s voice
across two domains when the two smartwatches are held vertically.
Specifically, Huawei Watch 2 obtain 91% average accuracy while LG
Urban W150 achieves 94% accuracy. The results indicate that even
under such extreme cases when people speak the same command,
WearID can distinguish them correctly.
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(a) Huawei watch 2 (b) LG Urban W150
Figure 15: Confusion matrix for distinguishing people’s voices
based on the same commands with vertical holding way.
7.4.1 Against Random Attack. Under the random attack, an ad-
versary does not have prior information of the user’s voice sound and
try to use his/her own voice to bypass the VA system. Since the user
is absent from the VA system, the voice sound received by the user’s
wearable (e.g., the user’s voice sound) would be different from that
recorded by the VA system. To evaluate the performance of WearID
under random voice attacks, we let each participant alternatively
performs as the legitimate user and be attacked by other participants.
The wearable records the user’s voice sound and the VA system’s
microphone records the adversaries’ sound. Figure 12 and Figure 13
show the average ROC curves of WearID (e.g., blue) to verify the
users with two different wearables under the two typical holding
ways. We observe that WearID can verify the user and reject ran-
dom attacks with high accuracy. In particular, the AUCs for Huawei
watch 2 and LG Urbane W150 are 94.46% and 88.85% under the
horizontal holding way. In addition, the vertical holding way shows
slightly higher AUC, which are 96.81% and 91.34% for Huawei watch
2 and LG Urbane W150 respectively. Moreover, given a FPR of 5%,
WearID can achieve high TPRs of 95.21% and 98.47% for Huawei
watch 2 held in horizontal and vertical directions respectively. The
results indicate that WearID is effective to protect the VA system and
verify the users with high accuracy under random attack. Moreover,
in the practical scenarios, a legitimate user does not always speak
and the wearable device usually records environmental noises. Thus
the performance under random attack would approach to the normal
situation (i.e., red curves).
7.4.2 Against Impersonation and Replay/Synthesis Attack.
We now consider the more sophisticated attacks on user’s absence,
which imitate/synthesize or just replay the legitimate user’s voice
commands to break the VA system. Ideally, an adversary could
generate the voice sound which is exactly the same as the legitimate
user. But the wearable is associated with the absent user and out of
the adversary’s control and it seldom happens when the two non-
collocated devices (i.e., VA device and the wearable) receive the
exactly same voice sounds from two independent sources. Because
the wearable may still be possible to record the user’s voice but with
other speech content, we evaluate WearID in a more challenging
scenario where the legitimate user’s voice sounds are directly used
for the attacking sounds of impersonation and replay attacks.
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the average ROC curve (i.e., black
curves) when verifying the user under impersonation/replay attacks.
We find that WearID successfully verify the user by using both
Huawei watch 2 and LG Urbane W150 under both horizontal and
vertical holding ways. In particular, WearID achieves 89.12% and
86.78% for Huawei Watch 2 and LG Urbane W150 under horizon-
tal holding way. The AUCs are 91.23% and 88.34% under vertical
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Figure 16: The frequency responses of the VA system and the
wearables under ultrasound attacks.
holding way. For a FPR of 10%, WearID can obtain the TPRs of
91.25% and 93.29% when Huawei watch 2 is held in horizontal and
vertical directions. We find the performance of WearID under imper-
sonation and replay attacks are slightly lower than those obtained
under random attacks. This is because the adversary has obtained the
additional knowledge about the user’s voice to improve the attack.
But WearID still protects the user’s privacy with high verification
accuracy under this more challenging attacks. Moreover, in the prac-
tical scenarios, a legitimate user’s wearable device does not always
records the user’s voice sounds, which make the performance ap-
proaching to that under normal situation.
7.5 User Verification under Co-location Attack
Besides launching attacks when the user’s absent, an adversary can
also execute some special attacking sounds to both the VA devce
and the user’s wearable without causing any notice.
Against Hidden Voice Command. Under hidden voice attack,
an adversary hides the recorded user voice sound into the noise
sound, which is unintelligible to human but can be interpreted as
commands by the VA system devices [8]. The adversary then plays
back such noisy sound using a loudspeaker to control the VA system
without causing the user’s notice. In such scenario, both the VA
system’s microphone and the user’s wearable receive the hidden
commands. Figure 17 depicts the CDFs of the 2D-correlations be-
tween the microphone data and motion sensor data under hidden
voice commands, where the loudspeaker is placed 25cm away to the
two wearables and the volume is set to the maximum. We observe
that the 2D-correlations between microphone and motion sensor
are low for the hidden voice commands, which can be differenti-
ated well from the legitimate user’s voice commands. In particular,
the median of the 2D-correlation coefficients for the hidden voice
commands is around 0 for Huawei watch 2 and 0.05 for LG Urban
W150. In comparison, the median 2D-correlation coefficients for the
legitimate user’s voice commands are around 0.5 for Huawei watch
2 and 0.4 for LG Urban W150. The reason is that motion sensors
on the wearable has short response distance and unique response
characteristics to sound. An adversary is hard to fool the system
which is developed based on verifying the sound from two domain
information. The hidden voice attacks can thus be defended.
Against Ultrasound Attack. Under the ultrasound attack, an ad-
versary modulates the recorded user voice command to an inaudible
frequency and plays back it using an ultrasound speaker. Such inaudi-
ble sounds can be recognized by the VA system but is hardly heard
by the user [34]. In this scenario, both the VA’s microphone and the
user’s wearable device is exposed to this inaudible sound. We thus
evaluate WearID to see whether the ultrasound could leave similar
responses on the both devices. In particular, we use a function gener-
ator (i.e., Keysight Technologies 33509B [28]) to generate a chirp
of 15kHz ∼ 25kHz and play the chirp using a tweeter speaker [14],
which is placed 25cm away from the wearable. Figure 16 shows the
frequency responses of VA microphone and the two smartwatches’
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Figure 17: CDF of the 2D correlations between the microphone
and the motion sensor data for the hidden voice commands and
the legitimate user’s voice commands.
accelerometers. We can find that the microphone show responses
from 15kHz 24kHz, which is a hardly heard frequency range. In
comparison, we do not observe any responses on the two smart-
watches. The experimental results that show even if the microphone
is passed by the ultrasound attacks, the wearable’s motion sensors
reject the ultrasound.
8 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present WearID, a wearable-assisted verification
system for Voice Assistant (VA) systems (e.g., Amazon Echo and
Google Home). WearID verifies whether the voice command re-
ceived by the VA system comes from the legitimate user based on
examining the command sound recorded in two domains (i.e., audio
and vibration). In particular, WearID compares the voice command
recorded by the VA device’s microphone with that of the legitimate
user’s wearable motion sensor to calculate the cross-domain speech
similarity. We show that the motion sensors of the wearable have
a short response distance to sounds and exhibit different response
characteristics from microphones. We further identify their complex
relationship, which is hard to forge in various audible and inaudible
acoustic attacks such as replay attacks and ultrasound attacks. To
compare the similarity between the two different sensing modalities
under a huge sampling rate gap (e.g., 8000Hz vs. 200Hz), WearID
converts the microphone data to low frequency data based on the
unique frequency response characteristics of the motion sensor. The
converted microphone data shows the similar spectrogram as that of
the real motion sensor data. WearID then calculates shift 2D correla-
tion between the spectrograms of the two data to verify the command
sound. Moreover, WearID is easy to be deployed on the off-the-shelf
wearable devices and does not require any hardware changes to
the VA systems. Extensive experiments with two commodity smart-
watches and 1000 commands are conducted and WearID is evaluated
under both the attack on user’s absence (e.g., replay attack) and
the co-location attack (i.e., the hidden voice and the ultrasound at-
tack). Experiments show that WearID can verify the command sound
with 99.8% accuracy in normal situation and detect 97% fake voice
commands under various acoustic attacks.
WearID is designed for the mass population of wearable users and
is more secure than the existing methods such as virtual button [11]
on the wearable devices, proximity detection (e.g., using Bluetooth
and WiFi) and liveness detection [9]. All the three approaches have
no or limited capability to verify the sound source and still suffer
from many acoustic attacks such as hidden command attack and
ultrasound attack. In addition, WearID requires minimum user effort,
while the liveness detection requires user’s mouth to be very close to
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the VA device and using a virtual button to access the VA system is
quite cumbersome, which requires the user to unlock the wearable,
find the App (or button), press the button and wait.
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Figure A: The time-domain correlation between the micro-
phone data and motion sensor, which are resampled to the same
sampling rate level (Illustrated with 10 words on Amazon Echo
and Huawei watch 2).
A.1 Difficulty of Comparing Microphone Data
with Motion Sensor Data
Figure A illustrates the difficulty of comparing the microphone data
with the motion sensor data, where a participant speaks ten words to
both a microphone and a accelerometer, and both data are re-sampled
to the same sampling rate for similarity comparison. Particularly,
Figure A (a) shows the time-domain correlation coefficient between
the microphone recorded sound (i.e., X axis) and motion sensor data
(i.e., Y axis) by cross-comparing ten words. We observe that the cor-
relations at the diagonal (i.e., same word sound) and non-diagonal
(i.e., different word sounds) are indistinguishable. The results indi-
cate that the re-sampling technique and the time-domain analysis are
insufficient to address the similarity comparison of the two different
sensing modalities. Figure A(b), CDF of the correlation coefficients,
further depicts the challenge of matching the sound across the two
domains, where the sound of the same word and those of different
words all show low correlation values (i.e., less than 0.1). Thus, we
need to investigate the inherent unique relationship between the two
sensing modalities to facilitate their similarity comparison.
(a) Spectrogram of microphone
(b) Spectrogram of wearable accelerometer
Figure B: Spectrogram of the single frequency signal (850Hz)
on microphone and wearable device (i.e., Huawei watch 2
sport).
A.2 Algorithm for Spectrogram based Conversion
Algorithm 1 Spectrogram-based Conversion Algorithm
function CONVERSION(Smic )
2: Input: Smic -original microphone spectrogram
fws -sampling rate of accelerometer
4: Output: ˆSmic -converted microphone spectrogram
| ˆSmic = zeros(T , F ) |, ωws = 2π × fws
6: for t = 1 : T do
for fm ic = 700 : 3300 do
8: // Frequency selection
for Nshif t = −10 : 10 do
10: fw = |fmic − Nshif t × fws |
if |Smic (tn, fm ) | > 70dB & fw ≤ fs & fw > 0 then
12: // Amplitude selection
ˆSmic (tn, fw ) = ˆSmic (tn, fw ) + |Smic (tn, fm ) |
14: // Spectrogram-based frequency conversion
end if
16: end for
end for
18: end for
end function
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A.3 Wearable Device Specifications
Table A: The specifications of the accelerometers in the tested wearable devices.
Manufactory Model Accelerometer User Programmable Range Sensor sampling rate System sampling rate
LG Urbane watch 150 Invensense M6515 ±2д, ±4д, ±8д, ±16д 4-4000Hz 200Hz
Huawei Huawei watch 2 sport STMicroelectronics LSM6DS3 ±2д, ±4д, ±8д, ±16д 4-1600Hz 100Hz
A.4 Examples of the Voice Commands
Table B: Example of privacy leakages from voice assistant systems.
Security issues Category Voice Command Examples Sentence Length
Potential privacy leakage
Event schedule
"What’s on my calendar for tomorrow" 6
"Where is my next appointment" 5
"List all events for January 1st" 6
"How much is a round-trip flight to New York" 9
Reminder
"Remember that my password is ’money’" 6
"What is my password" 4
"Add ’go to the grocery store’ to my to-do list" 10
Shopping account information
"What’s on my shopping list" 5
"Track my order" 3
Contact
"Read me my email" 4
"Call my mother" 3
Unauthorized operation
Neighborhood location
"Find me a Italian near my home" 7
"What is the traffic to my home" 7
Unauthorized purchase
"Add paper towels to my cart" 6
"Order all items in my cart" 6
Voice assistant
"Answer the call" 3
"Delete all my reminders" 4
"Play my favorite music on Spotify" 6
Access smart home devices
"Show the living room camera" 5
"Clear all Bluetooth devices" 4
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